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Abstract. This paper uses a new and comprehensive dataset to investigate the capital structure of 
non-financial firms in a major emerging market economy, Turkey. We study both statistical and 
economic significance of four types of leverage factors: Firm-specific, tax-related, industry-
specific, and macroeconomic. Results suggest that tax-related factors and asset tangibility are the 
most economically significant factors for short-term and long-term debt ratios, respectively. 
Results also suggest that inflation is an important determinant of leverage and the most 
economically significant macroeconomic factor. Moreover, we provide evidence that firms adjust 
their leverage towards the industry median, that firms match the maturity of their assets and 
liabilities, and that inflows of foreign capital have a marked influence on firms’ capital structures, 
particularly on large and mature non-manufacturing firms. We also conduct a systematic analysis 
of capital structure differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing, small and large, 
and young and mature firms. Overall, the trade-off theory appears to be more successful than the 
pecking order theory in accounting for the capital structure of Turkish non-financial firms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past few decades, there has been an outpouring of empirical research aimed at 
understanding how firms choose their capital structures. While the earlier work concentrated on 
the developed countries, particularly the United States, a major preoccupation of recent research 
has been to find out whether the factors that are correlated in the cross-section with firm leverage 
in the developed countries are similarly correlated in emerging and developing countries. Despite 
considerable progress, the issue is not settled, both for developed and developing countries, and 
more so for the latter.   
In this paper, we investigate the factors that determine the capital structure choices of non-
financial firms in a major emerging market economy, namely, Turkey. Although there is by now 
an abundance of research on capital structure in emerging and developing economies, these 
studies cannot to speak to the capital structure choice of the average non-financial firm as they 
generally focus on manufacturing firms listed on the stock exchanges, while neglecting both 
private firms and non-manufacturing firms. Moreover, data limitations force most studies to limit 
the span of their analyses to less than ten years. We contribute to this line of literature by utilizing 
a unique and comprehensive dataset compiled by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
(CBRT) that provides financial data for Turkish private as well as public manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms for the past twenty years. Since this dataset is substantially more 
representative of the universe of Turkish non-financial firms and has a longer time span, it 
enables us to take a more accurate picture of the capital structure decisions of the average non-
financial firm in Turkey. It also allows us to investigate systematically the capital structure 
differences between firms of various kinds. To our knowledge, no empirical study exists having 
these features of our paper in the context of capital structure research on emerging and 
developing economies. 
The extant literature reviewed in Section 2 has identified several factors that are correlated in the 
cross-section with firm leverage in both developed and developing countries. Following this body 
of work, we investigate concurrently the influences on leverage of four types of variables: Firm-
specific, tax-related, industry-specific, and macroeconomic. Several results emerge from our 
panel data analysis. In particular, we find that most of the independent variables have the signs 
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that would be expected in light of previous theoretical work and the empirical findings obtained 
for other countries. Specifically, we provide evidence that leverage (short-term, long-term, or 
total) is positively correlated with size, potential debt tax shields, industry median debt ratios, 
inflation, and capital inflows, and negatively correlated with profitability, business risk, and real 
GDP growth. Asset tangibility is positively correlated with long-term and total leverage but 
negatively correlated with short-term leverage. Firm growth, on the other hand, does not seem to 
be related with firms’ leverage decisions. The positive correlation of leverage with inflation is 
consistent with the notion that, in the presence of tax-deductibility of nominal interest payments, 
an inflation-induced increase in nominal interest rates increases the tax advantage of debt 
financing. On the other hand, the positive association of leverage with industry median leverage 
can be interpreted as evidence of target adjustment behavior wherein firms adjust their leverage 
towards the industry median. Finally, the finding that tangibility is positively correlated with 
long-term leverage but negatively correlated with short-term leverage might be interpreted as 
evidence that firms match the maturity of their assets and liabilities. 
In addition to statistical significance, we investigate the economic significance of leverage factors 
and find that each of the four types of leverage factors does indeed play an economically 
important role in shaping the capital structure decisions of Turkish non-financial firms during our 
sample period. Specifically, our findings indicate that while potential debt tax shields are the 
most economically significant factor for short-term and total leverage, tangibility is the most 
economically significant factor for long-term leverage. Firm size is another major determinant of 
leverage, second only to tangibility and potential debt tax shields for long-term and total leverage, 
respectively. Industry median leverage and inflation also play a notable but smaller role when 
compared to firm size, profitability, tangibility, and tax-related factors.  
We next investigate the capital structure differences between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing, large and small, and mature and young firms. One of our main findings is that 
regardless of their size, age, and industrial membership, firms’ short-term leverage is generally 
substantially larger than their long-term leverage. We also find that manufacturing firms and 
young firms generally have higher leverage (both short-term and long-term) than non-
manufacturing firms and mature firms, respectively. Large firms, on the other hand, have higher 
long-term leverage but lower short-term leverage than small firms. Therefore, it is the young and 
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small manufacturing firms that have the highest levels of short-term indebtedness. Another major 
finding in our analysis is that what matters most for a firm’s capital structure is not its age or 
industrial membership but rather its size. In this regard, we provide evidence that short-term debt 
ratios increase with firm size, but only for firms that are sufficiently large, indicating a “threshold 
effect” in size for short-term indebtedness. Also, business risk appears to be an important 
determinant of the capital structures of small firms but not large firms, which might suggest 
differences between small and large firms in access to external finance. Inflation, while very 
important for large firms, does not seem to be related with the leverage decisions of small firms, 
indicating that, once the direct leverage impact of taxes is taken into account, inflation does not 
induce a further tax benefit for debt financing for small firms.  Capital flows influence large and 
small firms differently as well, having a considerably greater importance for the leverage 
decisions of large firms, particularly those that are mature and outside the manufacturing 
industry.  
On the whole, our empirical findings suggest that the trade-off theory is a better description of the 
capital structure of Turkish non-financial firms than the pecking-order theory. This is in stark 
contrast with the judgments of previous researchers on the Turkish economy. This difference in 
judgments is in part due to the fact that we use a more comprehensive and representative dataset 
that allows us to measure the leverage effects of different factors much more precisely. Another 
contributing factor is the fact that, for some of the leverage determinants we consider, the trade-
off theory has a prediction while the pecking order theory does not.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature on capital structure. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 summarizes 
the hypotheses regarding the relationship between leverage and its determinants. Section 5 
presents the main results and a number of robustness checks. Section 6 sheds light on the capital 
structure differences between firms of various types. Section 7 evaluates the predictive abilities of 
static trade-off and pecking order theories in light of our empirical findings. Section 8 provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
5 
 
2. Related literature 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), there has been extensive theoretical work on the 
determinants of firms’ capital structures, yet we do not have a unifying model that can 
simultaneously account for all of the observed relationships. The two major competing theories of 
capital structure are the static trade-off theory, wherein firms balance tax savings from debt 
against deadweight bankruptcy costs, and the pecking order theory, wherein, due to adverse 
selection, firms prefer internal to external financing and debt to equity if external financing is 
used.1 Each of these theories, however, has problems with different characteristics of the 
observed data. Even the state-of-the-art versions of these theories cannot do a fully satisfactory 
job of confronting the data.   
Nevertheless, the trade off, pecking order, and other theories have been instrumental in 
identifying a large number of factors that seem to be correlated with firms’ debt ratios. Frank and 
Goyal (2009) lists as many as 36 variables that are correlated with the leverage decisions of 
publicly traded U.S. firms (see, also, Harris and Raviv, 1991). Empirical studies typically employ 
a variety of variables from this list that can be justified using any of the existing theoretical 
models.  
Most of the earlier research attempts to test various theories using the developed countries, 
mainly the United States, as a laboratory (e.g. Bradley et al., 1984; Taggart Jr, 1985; Pozdena, 
1987; Titman and Wessels, 1988). In an influential study, Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that 
factors such as growth, size, profitability, and tangibility, which are correlated in the cross-section 
with firm leverage in the United States are similarly correlated in the other G-7 countries as well. 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), there has been an outpouring of empirical research on 
international comparisons of capital structure including, among others, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1996 and 1999), Wald (1999), De Jong et al. (2008), and Antoniou et al. (2008). A 
particularly important study in this line of research has been Booth et al. (2001), which provides 
evidence that firms’ capital structure decisions in developing countries are affected by the same 
                                                          
1
 We do not consider the market timing theory here as it is probably more relevant for public firms whereas the 
majority of firms in our dataset are private. Agency or signaling considerations, on the other hand, can easily be 
incorporated into either of the two major theories.  
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variables as in developed countries. There are also a growing number of studies that explore the 
determinants of capital structure in individual emerging and developing countries.2    
In this paper, we contribute to this last strand of literature by analyzing the capital structure of 
Turkish non-financial firms. Previous studies on the Turkish economy include, among others, 
Durukan (1997, 1998), Gönenç (2003), Acaravcı and Doğukanlı (2004), Aydın et al. (2006) 
Sayılgan et al. (2006), Korkmaz et al. (2007), Yıldız et al. (2009), Demirhan (2009), and Okuyan 
and Taşçı (2010). These papers study the capital structure choice of manufacturing firms listed on 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) from various angles and for different time periods. There are 
three exceptions: Demirhan (2009) focuses on non-manufacturing firms on the ISE, Okuyan and 
Taşçı (2010) use a dataset compiled by Istanbul Chamber of Industry that provides information 
on the largest 1000 manufacturing firms in Turkey, and Aydın et al. (2006) use the same dataset 
as ours but restrict themselves only to a descriptive analysis of firms’ capital structures. 
Cebenoyan et al. (1995) and Dinçergök and Yalçıner (2011), on the other hand, carry out 
comparative studies of Turkey, Greece, Canada, and the U.S., and of Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, 
and Indonesia, respectively, again using data on listed manufacturing firms.  
Our study differs from these studies in an important way. Specifically, we utilize a dataset that (i) 
covers not only listed firms but also privately-held firms, (ii) includes both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms, and (iii) as we shall explain in Section 3, contains a substantially larger 
number of firms and spans a considerably longer time period than previous studies. Therefore, the 
novelty of our study comes from the fact that we are the first to investigate the capital structures 
of non-financial firms in Turkey using a comprehensive micro-level dataset over a relatively long 
time horizon. This enables us to take a significantly more accurate account of the average non-
financial firm’s capital structure choice in Turkey than previous studies. It also allows us to carry 
out a systematic analysis of capital structure differences between firms of various kinds (e.g. 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing, large and small, mature and young firms). To the best of 
our knowledge, our dataset is more comprehensive (both in terms of leverage factors suggested 
by theory and time coverage) than the datasets used in capital structure studies on other emerging 
and developing countries as well. Last but not least, and in contrast with previous studies, our 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Mohamad (1995) for Malaysia; Wiwattanakantang (1999) for Thailand; Bhaduri (2002) for India; 
Omran and Pointon (2004) for Egypt; Huang and Song (2006) for China; Correa et al. (2007) for Brazil; and Qureshi 
(2009) for Pakistan. 
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findings provide evidence that the trade-off theory may be a better description than the pecking 
order theory of the capital structures of Turkish non-financial firms. 
3. Data 
Our firm- and industry-specific data come from the Sectoral Balance Sheets Dataset (SBSD) of 
the CBRT, which is the largest source of annual balance sheet and income statement data on 
Turkish non-financial firms.3 Our sample period covers the years 1996-2009. The sample 
includes almost all of the largest non-financial firms, many of which are also listed on the ISE. 
There are on average about 9000 firms employing a total of 1.5 million workers each year. This is 
substantially larger than the corresponding figures for non-financial firms listed on the ISE during 
the same period (138 firms employing 225 thousand workers), indicating that the SBSD is 
significantly more representative of the population of Turkish non-financial firms than the ISE.  
The two broad industry categories we use are ‘manufacturing’ (excluding petroleum and nuclear 
energy production) and ‘non-manufacturing’ or ‘services’.4 Our data on macroeconomic and tax-
related variables, on the other hand, are collected from a variety of sources including SBSD, ISE, 
Undersecretariat of Treasury of the Republic of Turkey, and World Development Indicators. 
To minimize the effects of outliers in the data on our results, we use winsorization, in which the 
most extreme tails of the distribution are replaced by the most extreme value that has not been 
removed (Frank and Goyal, 2008). Following common practice, we winsorize each tail at 0.5 
percent. The final sample is an unbalanced panel of 11726 firms (roughly 53 percent of which are 
manufacturing) with 74155 firm-year observations. We do not have 14 years of data for all firms 
because each year some firms enter or exit the sample.5 
 
                                                          
3
 SBSD firms report unconsolidated balance sheets. As noted by Rajan and Zingales (1995), this may cause firms to 
incorrectly appear to have lower leverage than otherwise identical firms who report consolidated balance sheets. This 
should not be a serious problem for our analyses since most of the sample firms are stand-alone enterprises. Still, 
some care is warranted in interpreting the results. 
4
 The industries we exclude are: agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing; mining; electricity, gas, and water supply; 
air transportation; communications; real estate, renting, and business activities; education; health and social work; 
and other community, social, and personal service activities. Unlike the industries included in our analyses, these 
industries are generally under the influence of various sorts of government intervention that distort the operation of 
market forces.  
5
 Possible bias introduced by firm entry or exit is discussed in Section 5. 
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4. Variables and hypotheses  
We consider three different measures of leverage: Short-term, long-term, and total debt over total 
assets. According to Rajan and Zingales (1995), this is a more appropriate measure of financial 
leverage than the ratio of liabilities (both short term and long term) to total assets because it 
provides a better indication of whether the firm is at risk of default any time soon and also a more 
accurate picture of past financing choices. Debt is classified as long-term if it has a maturity of at 
least one year and short-term otherwise. 
On the other hand, we use four types of independent variables, namely, firm-specific, tax-related, 
industry-specific, and macroeconomic as described below. The nature of the relationships 
between leverage and individual factors has been studied extensively in the literature. Our 
discussion benefits, among others, from the review by Frank and Goyal (2008).  
4.1 Firm-specific factors  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) use four firm-specific independent variables in their study of capital 
structures: size, profitability, growth, and tangibility. Booth et al. (2001) add business risk to this 
list. We include all five firm-specific variables in our analyses. 
Size Static trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. 
This is because larger firms are more diversified and have lower default risk. The pecking order 
theory, on the other hand, is generally interpreted as predicting a negative relationship, since large 
firms face lower adverse selection and can more easily issue equity compared to small firms. 
However, as noted by Frank and Goyal (2008), adverse selection may not be necessarily lower 
for larger firms if the adverse selection impinges on a larger asset base. Therefore, the pecking 
order theory can also be interpreted as implying a positive relation between leverage and size. An 
overwhelming majority of empirical studies finds a positive relation between leverage and size. 
Following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), among others, we define 
size as the natural logarithm of total sales, adjusted for inflation.6 
                                                          
6
 We use total sales rather than total assets to alleviate the problem of multicollinearity since many of our variables 
are scaled by total assets, including those for debt ratios. These two measures are highly correlated, indicating that 
each of them should be a sound proxy for size.  
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Profitability Static trade-off theory is generally interpreted as predicting a positive relation 
between firm profitability and leverage. This is because default risk is lower and interest tax 
shields of debt are more valuable for profitable firms. However, Frank and Goyal (2008) argue 
that the trade-off theory can also be viewed as predicting an inverse relation between leverage 
and profitability. This would be true, for instance, if profitability is a better proxy for growth 
opportunities than market-to-book ratios. Moreover, dynamic trade-off models generally predict a 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability (see, for example, Fischer et al., 1989, 
and Hennessy and Whited, 2005). Thus, the trade-off prediction for profitability is ambiguous. 
Pecking order theory, on the other hand, predicts a negative relation between leverage and 
profitability, as profitable firms can use earnings to fund investment opportunities and hence have 
less need for external debt. Empirical tests find the relation to be robustly negative. Following 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and De Jong et al. (2008), among others, we define profitability as 
operating income over total assets. 
Tangibility We use tangibility as a proxy for the type of assets. The static trade-off theory 
predicts a positive relation between leverage and tangibility. This is because tangible assets are 
easier to collateralize and they suffer a smaller loss of value when firms go into distress. In 
addition, since firms tend to match the maturity of assets with that of liabilities (Stohs and Mauer, 
1996), tangibility should be positively correlated with long-term leverage. The pecking order 
theory, on the other hand, is generally interpreted as predicting a negative relation between 
leverage and tangibility, since the low information asymmetry associated with tangible assets 
makes the issuance of equity less costly (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Empirical studies generally 
find a positive correlation between tangibility and total and long-term leverage. Following Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), we define tangibility as the 
ratio of net fixed assets to total assets.  
Growth Static trade-off theory predicts a negative relation between leverage and firm 
growth. Intangibility of the assets of growth firms implies that they lose more of their value in the 
event of financial distress. By contrast, the pecking order theory predicts a positive relation 
between leverage and growth. This is because internal funds are unlikely to be sufficient to 
support investment opportunities for high growth firms, which increases their demand for 
external debt. Although the results are mixed, most empirical work finds the relation between 
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leverage and growth to be negative. Since our sample consists of both private and public firms, 
we cannot use market measures such as market-to-book ratios to proxy for growth. Our proxy is 
the percent change in sales as in Frank and Goyal (2009) and Schoubben and Van Hulle (2004). 
Business risk Both the static trade-off and pecking order theories predict a negative relationship 
between leverage and business risk. The trade-off theory implies that the expected cost of 
financial distress increases with risk, at least for reasonable parameter values. In addition, the 
probability of wasting interest tax shields increases when earnings are less than tax shields (Frank 
and Goyal, 2008). Both forces work to reduce leverage. From a pecking order perspective, 
business risk exacerbates the adverse selection between firms and creditors. Most empirical work 
find a negative relation between leverage and risk. In this study, business risk is defined as the 
standard deviation of operating income over total assets over the past three years (including the 
current year) as in De Jong et al. (2008).  
4.2 Tax-related factors 
The two tax-related factors we consider are corporate taxes and non-debt tax shields.7 These 
factors naturally fit in with the static trade-off theory.  
Corporate taxes Static trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between corporate 
tax rates and leverage. This is because features of the tax code allow interest payments to be 
deducted from the tax bill but not dividend payments, which provides a tax advantage for debt. 
The effect of taxes on debt ratios, however, has been difficult to clearly identify in the data and 
the available evidence is rather mixed (see, for example, Frank and Goyal, 2008, and Antoniou et 
al., 2008). One explanation for this might be the uncertainty about what would constitute a good 
proxy for tax effects. Another explanation is that transaction costs make it difficult to identify tax 
effects even when they are an element of the firm’s problem (Hennessy and Whited, 2005). 
 
Non-debt tax shields DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) were probably the first to formally introduce 
the concept of non-debt tax shields to the literature. Examples of such shields include 
                                                          
7
 Studies such as Miller (1977) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) recommend including both personal and corporate 
taxes in studies of capital structure.  However, in Turkey, tax rates on equity and debt income at the personal level 
are extremely complicated and have gone through several reforms during the past two decades. This makes it almost 
impossible to come up with good indicators of personal tax rates on different sources of income that would also be 
consistent over time. As a result, we are forced to do away with personal taxes in our analyses. 
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depreciation deductions, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits. These shields can be 
considered as substitutes for the corporate tax benefits of debt financing. Accordingly, firms with 
higher amounts of non-debt tax shields will choose to have lower levels of debt. Thus, the static 
trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage and non-debt tax shields. More 
often than not, empirical studies find results that are supportive of this prediction.  
 
Rather than including corporate taxes and non-debt tax shields separately in our analyses, we use 
a single indicator that simultaneously takes into account the presence of both effects. Whether a 
firm actually enjoys a positive tax advantage for debt financing depends on the trade-off between 
these two effects. Building on DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Shuetrim et al. (1993) propose a measure called the “potential debt tax shield (PDTS)” that 
captures the net effect of these two forces:  
 
 = 	 +

 															 > 0		0																									 = 0 	, 
 
where 	 and 	 denote, respectively, interest payments and tax payments by firm i at time t and 
	 denotes the statutory corporate tax rate at time t. PDTS is gross earnings minus non-debt tax 
shields and Shuetrim et al. (1993) show that it is equal to the sum of interest paid and taxable 
income after all non-debt tax deductions have been made as shown in the above expression.8 
They scale this sum by a firm’s total assets to get their final proxy of net tax shields. Note that 
when tax payments are zero (i.e. tax is exhausted), the relative proportions of income shielded by 
interest payments and by non-debt tax shields cannot be determined and hence PDTS is set to 
zero. In order to control for this possibility, we follow Shuetrim et al. (1993) and include firms’ 
state of tax exhaustion as a separate regressor in our analyses. It is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 for all observations when the tax paid by a firm is equal to zero. Its value can be interpreted 
as the mean effect of PDTS on leverage taken over all observations with zero tax payments. From 
a trade-off perspective, the predicted relation between this dummy variable and leverage is 
positive. Note that both PDTS and tax exhaust factors can be calculated at the firm level, that is, 
they are firm-specific. 
                                                          
8
 This measure is also desirable because it takes into account the actual statutory tax rates and the fact that firms 
focus on the amount of income that can be shielded from tax using interest payments. 
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4.3 Industry-specific factors 
The extant literature reviewed in articles such as Harris and Raviv (1991) and Frank and Goyal 
(2008) suggests that industry membership may be an important determinant of firms’ capital 
structures. According to Frank and Goyal (2009), this is mainly because industry reflects a 
number of otherwise omitted factors common to all firms. For example, supply and demand 
conditions or the extent of competition may differ from industry to industry. From a trade-off 
perspective, therefore, although imperfect, the industry median leverage is likely to be a proxy for 
firms’ target capital structure. Not entirely coincidentally, empirical evidence on industry effects 
is rather mixed. For instance, while Hovakimian et al. (2001) find that firms adjust their debt 
ratios towards industry median debt ratios, Mackay and Phillips (2005) provide evidence that 
there is significantly more variation in leverage within industries than across industries. For a 
given year, we define industry median leverage as the median of (short, long, or total) debt to 
total assets in that industry (that is, one for each of the two broad industry categories, 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing). 
 
4.4 Macroeconomic factors  
In order to explore the influence of the macroeconomic environment on firms’ capital structures, 
we include key macroeconomic variables in our analyses. Specifically, we include inflation and 
GDP growth as indicators of the general economic environment and the size of capital flows as 
an indicator of financial development. 
Inflation According to Taggart (1985), features of the tax code in the U.S. increases the real 
value of interest tax deductions on debt when inflation is expected to be high. Thus, the static 
trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and expected inflation. By 
contrast, it is hard to see why inflation would matter for firms’ leverage decisions in a model of 
pecking order (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Empirical studies generally find a positive relation 
between leverage and inflation. In the absence of inflation expectations data that spans the whole 
sample period, we follow previous studies and use data on the realized inflation. Specifically, we 
use the percentage change in the annual consumer price index (CPI) as a rough proxy for 
expected inflation. It is important to note that the debt-bias in the U.S. tax system alluded to by 
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Taggart (1985) is also a feature of the tax systems of many countries around the world, including 
that of Turkey. 
GDP growth Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth can be viewed as a measure of the 
growth opportunities available to firms in an economy. In a high growth environment, the 
scarcity of firms’ tangible assets relative to available investment opportunities implies a higher 
loss of value when firms go into distress. Hence, the static trade-off theory predicts a negative 
relation between leverage and GDP growth. By contrast, the pecking order theory predicts a 
positive relation between leverage and macroeconomic growth, since a high ratio of growth 
opportunities to internal funds would imply a greater need for external finance. Empirical studies 
generally find a negative association between leverage and macroeconomic growth (see, for 
example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996). Following common practice, we define GDP 
growth as the percent change in the annual real GDP.  
Capital flows Empirical studies such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) and Antoniou 
et al. (2008), among others, provide evidence on the importance of capital markets for firms’ 
capital structures. The size and structure of capital markets play a key role in determining the 
availability and allocation of funds to various types of firms within an economy. Domestic capital 
markets, in turn, are heavily shaped by the flows of international capital in many emerging 
market economies, including that of Turkey (see, for example, Kose et al., 2006). While inflows 
of capital lead to increases in the size of domestic capital markets, outflows lead to declines. In 
order to study the impact of capital flows (and hence financial development) on firms’ capital 
structures, we include the ratio of net capital flows to GDP as an additional explanatory variable 
in our regression equations.  
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of various leverage measures and leverage factors as well as 
the theoretical predictions for the relations between the dependent and independent variables.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all of our variables during 1996-2009. The median is 
below the mean for all three debt ratios. The divergence between the mean and median debt ratios 
is larger for the long-term debt ratio as the majority of firms have little to no long-term debt. 
Moreover, firm growth rates have the largest variance, with the mean significantly greater than 
the median. 
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 [Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
5. Empirical model and results  
In this section, we present our empirical model, discuss the main results, and perform a number of 
robustness checks.  
5.1 Empirical model 
We model leverage as a function of various factors discussed in the previous section. 
Specifically, we estimate the following fixed effects panel data model: 
  itik itkkit
FL εµββ +++= ∑ ,0 , (1) 
where 	 is one of the three measures of leverage (short, long, or total leverage) of firm i  in year
t ;  is the vector of the four types of leverage factors (firm-specific, tax-related, industry-
specific, and macroeconomic factors);  are the time-invariant unobservable firm-specific 
effects; and 			 is the error term. We estimate equation (1) using standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  
5.2 Results 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (1). In what follows, we summarize the 
results and evaluate them in light of theoretical hypotheses and previous empirical findings.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.2.1 Firm-specific factors 
The first five rows of Table 3 display the estimated coefficients for our firm-specific factors. The 
coefficients of size, profitability, and tangibility are significant at the 1 percent level in all 
leverage equations. Size is positively associated with all three debt ratios, suggesting that ceteris 
paribus large firms have more debt in their capital structures. By contrast, the relation between 
profitability and various debt ratios is negative, implying that more profitable firms have lower 
debt ratios. While our result on size is consistent with the prediction of static trade-off theory, our 
result on profitability is consistent with the pecking order theory. These findings are also in line 
with the empirical evidence found in previous studies.  
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Tangibility is negatively associated with short-term leverage but positively associated with long-
term and total leverage. Thus, firms with more tangible assets tend to have more long-term and 
less short-term debt in their capital structure. The fact that the signs of the estimated coefficients 
of the tangibility factor are opposite in the short- and long-term leverage equations can be 
interpreted as evidence that firms in Turkey match the maturity of their assets with their 
liabilities. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) report similar findings in their sample of 
nineteen developed and developing countries (Turkey is included) and Gönenç (2003) for 
industrial firms listed on the ISE. Overall, the results are consistent with the prediction of static 
trade-off theory but not with the pecking order theory. 
Finally, while firm growth appears to be unrelated with leverage, the estimated coefficient of our 
business risk variable is significantly negative in the long-term and total leverage equations. So, 
increases in a firm’s riskiness reduce the level of long-term debt in its capital structure but does 
not have a significant effect on the level of short-term debt relative to total assets. This is 
consistent with the view that firms that are viewed as risky by creditors find it more difficult to 
borrow long-term (see, for example, Diamond, 1991 or Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
Our results concerning the business risk factor can be understood within the framework of either 
static trade-off or pecking order theories. 
5.2.2 Tax-related factors 
The upper middle section of Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for our PDTS and tax 
exhaustion variables. The coefficients of both variables are significant at the 1 percent level in all 
leverage equations and have the signs predicted by the static trade-off theory. The positive and 
significant coefficient on PDTS suggests that the tax advantage of debt is greater than the tax 
advantage due to non-debt shields. The positive and significant coefficient on the tax exhaustion 
dummy, on the other hand, indicates that the tax distortions caused by the tax system are also 
important for firms that pay no tax.  
5.2.3 Industry-specific factors 
The lower middle section of Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for our industry median 
debt ratios. The coefficient of industry median leverage is positive and highly significant in all 
three leverage equations. Moreover, the association appears to be quantitatively strong: A 10 
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percentage point increase in the industry median short-term, long-term, and total leverage 
increases the average firm’s short-term, long-term, and total leverage by 3.29, 4.23, and 2.34 
percentage points, respectively. From a trade-off perspective, these findings can be interpreted as 
evidence of target adjustment behavior in leverage.  
5.2.4 Macroeconomic factors 
The bottom section of Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for our macroeconomic factors. 
In all equations, inflation is positively related with leverage and with coefficients that are 
significant at 1 percent. Therefore, firms’ indebtedness increases with inflation. This finding is 
consistent with the static trade-off theory in which, given the tax-deductibility of nominal interest 
payments, an inflation-induced increase in nominal interest rates increases the tax advantage of 
debt financing. In addition, the impact of inflation appears to be quite strong: The fact that 
inflation has come down from over 80 percent to less than 10 percent between 1996 and 2009 
would suggest roughly a 5 percent decline in the average firm’s total leverage due solely to the 
fall in inflation, all else equal.   
On the other hand, the coefficient on GDP growth is negative and highly significant in the long-
term and total leverage equations, but not the short-term leverage equation.  One explanation of 
this finding might be that the scarcity of firms’ tangible assets relative to available investment 
opportunities is exacerbated in a high growth environment. The implied higher loss of value in 
the event of a distress, in turn, reduces firms’ ability to raise longer-term debt. Put differently, 
creditors reduce the amount of long-term debt they extend because it allows them to review the 
firms’ decisions more frequently and, if necessary, to vary the terms of financing before sufficient 
losses have accumulated to make default by the borrower optimal (Diamond, 1991 and 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Overall, our findings on inflation and GDP growth 
appear to be consistent with the static trade-off theory.  
Finally, capital flows are positively and highly significantly correlated with all three measures of 
leverage, indicating that capital flows do in fact play an important role in shaping firms’ capital 
structures. Specifically, consistent with expectations, measures of leverage rise with inflows of 
capital and fall with outflows. While capital inflows are in principle beneficial for emerging 
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market economies, particularly for those with low saving rates such as Turkey,9 they can also lead 
to economic overheating, excessive appreciation, or pressures in particular sectors of the 
economy such as sectoral credit booms or asset price bubbles (Ostry et al., 2011). In particular, 
rapid growth in private indebtedness induced by capital inflows might be characteristic of the 
early stages of financial instability (Mishkin, 1997) and might cause banking crises (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2011). Our results, therefore, indicate that the surge in international capital flows since 
the early 2000s, which were only briefly interrupted by the global financial crisis, continue to 
pose serious risks to macroeconomic and financial stability. Reflecting these concerns, 
policymakers in emerging market economies have been very keen on finding appropriate ways to 
deal with the adverse effects of capital flows, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis. For 
example, Brazil and South Korea have chosen to implement capital control measures whereas 
Turkey and Indonesia have preferred macroprudential measures (see, for instance, Oduncu et. al., 
2013).  
5.3 Economic significance of leverage factors 
In the previous subsection, we investigated whether a given leverage factor, holding other factors 
constant, was statistically significant in accounting for various debt ratios. However, statistical 
significance need not imply economic significance. In order to study the relative economic 
significance of various leverage factors, we standardize all variables and rerun our regressions. 
Now, the estimated standardized coefficients show the impact of a one standard deviation change 
in an independent variable on the dependent variable. Accordingly, the magnitudes of the 
standardized coefficients are comparable across different leverage factors for a given leverage 
equation (short-term, long-term, or total leverage). The left panel of Table 4 reports these results. 
The right panel of Table 4 sorts the leverage factors according to their economic significance, 
where the ordering is based on the absolute value of the standardized coefficients. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The results indicate that PDTS, our tax-shield measure, is the most economically significant 
factor for firms’ total leverage, with size a very close second. A one standard deviation increase 
                                                          
9
 Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), among others, argue that capital inflows can ease financing constraints for productive 
investment projects, foster the diversification of investment risk, promote intertemporal trade, and contribute to the 
development of financial markets. 
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in PDTS increases total leverage by 0.1595 standard deviations. PDTS is also the most important 
factor for short-term leverage, followed by profitability. For long-term leverage, tangibility is by 
far the most economically important factor, followed by size. Tax exhaust is consistently among 
the top three important factors.  
A few general lessons can be drawn from these results. Tax-related factors are overall the most 
economically significant leverage factors, suggesting that they in fact do play an important role in 
shaping firms’ capital structures. This finding is particularly interesting in light of the fact that tax 
effects on leverage have historically been notoriously difficult to detect in the data. A close 
second in terms of economic significance is firm-specific factors such as size, tangibility, and 
profitability, while business risk and firm growth play little or no role. Industry median leverage, 
on the other hand, appears to have a fairly important influence on firms’ leverage decisions. 
Macro-level factors generally score lower than firm-level (i.e. tax-related and firm-specific) 
factors and industry-level factors in the economic significance rankings, which is perhaps not 
surprising given that they have only a single observation per year. Among the macro-level 
factors, inflation stands out both in terms of statistical and economic significance, even 
surpassing in ranking the industry median debt ratio in the total leverage equation. The only case 
in which inflation is not the highest ranking macro-level factor is the long-term leverage equation, 
where it is second only to GDP growth and only by a small margin. These findings are 
particularly important in light of the fact that inflation in Turkey has only recently come down to 
single digits after decades of extremely high levels.  
A second general lesson is that the economic importance of a given leverage factor is different for 
different measures of leverage. For example, while tangibility appears to be a key determinant of 
long-term leverage, it is not as important for short-term leverage. A third and final lesson is that 
leverage factors that are more closely associated with the static trade-off theory such as tax-
related factors and size generally have higher rankings (in addition to having the correct signs and 
higher levels of statistical significance as shown in Section 5.2) than those that are more closely 
associated with the pecking order theory such as profitability. The evidence in favor of the trade-
off theory is particularly strong for the long-term and total debt ratios. 
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5.4 Robustness checks 
We perform a number of checks to confirm that our results are robust. First, it doesn’t matter 
whether the data is winsorized or not; estimated coefficients are qualitatively and quantitatively 
very similar. This suggests that outliers in our dataset are not a significant problem for estimates.    
Second, the fact that some firms in our dataset enter or exit the sample might potentially induce 
attrition bias in our estimations. To see if this is the case, we also estimate our empirical model 
only for those firms that have data for T years or more, where T = 2, 3, ..,14 (T = 1 corresponds to 
the full sample results we report in Section 5). Table 5 displays, for each leverage factor and for 
each of the short-term, long-term, and total regression equation specifications, the total number of 
positive and negative signs in the thirteen regressions we run. The results reported in Table 5 
indicate that our results are very robust.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Finally, we split the sample into two seven-year periods, namely, 1996-2002 and 2003-2009, to 
test for any structural breaks in the firms’ capital structure choices.10 The results displayed in 
Table 6 indicate that firm-specific and tax-related leverage factors generally have the same 
pattern of signs and significance as those we obtained for the full sample. The only significant 
change here is that the coefficient of firm growth turns significant in the short-term leverage 
equation in the 2003-2009 subsample, perhaps reflecting the improved growth prospects during 
this period. It is also interesting to note that the relative magnitude of the coefficient on tax 
exhaust (PDTS) is larger in the former (latter) period, which suggests that the tax distortions 
caused by the tax system during the earlier period are larger (smaller) for firms that pay no tax 
(pay tax). Also, the coefficient of business risk in the short-term leverage equation turns 
significant in the 1996-2002 subsample, most likely a reflection of the volatile state of the 
economy during this period. Finally, there are some changes in the signs and significance of some 
of the industry-level and macro-level factor coefficients.11 Specifically, the coefficient of industry 
                                                          
10
 Dividing the sample period in this way is reasonable given the fact that the Turkish economy went through a 
dramatic transformation following the crises in 2000 and 2001. See, for example, Turhan (2008). 
11
 This is, to some extent, expected as each of the industry- and macro-level factors (unlike the firm-level factors) has 
only two and one observations per year, respectively, and splitting the sample into two further reduces the sample 
size, making precise estimation of their coefficients difficult. 
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median debt ratio turns insignificant in the long-term leverage equation in both subsamples and 
there is a loss of significance in the coefficients of inflation, GDP growth, and capital flow 
variables. In the case of capital flows, the contrast is particularly stark, where the coefficient is 
significant only in the 2003-2009 subsample, most likely reflecting the surge in capital inflows 
during this period.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
6. Capital structures of firms in various circumstances 
Having examined the overall relation between various measures of leverage and their 
determinants in Section 5, we now investigate the differences between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms, large and small firms, and mature and young firms with respect to their 
capital structure choices.12 These exercises can also be viewed as additional robustness checks on 
our main results in Section 5. 
6.1 Manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms  
As discussed previously in Section 4.3, industry membership may be an important determinant of 
firms’ capital structures. To a certain extent, the analysis so far controls for industry effects since 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industry median debt ratios are included in the 
regressions. In this section, we take a closer look.  
Figure 1 displays the ratios of short-term, long-term, and total indebtedness for manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing firms averaged over the whole sample period. While manufacturing firms 
generally have higher debt ratios, the difference is more apparent in the short-term debt ratios.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In order to investigate the relation of debt ratios with various leverage factors, we also run 
regressions separately for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The results displayed in 
Table 7 suggest that manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms are in general quite similar in 
terms of their capital structures. Importantly, there are no material differences in the relations 
                                                          
12
 We also examined capital structure differences between profitable and unprofitable firms but did not find any 
meaningful differences. These results are available upon request.  
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between debt ratios and the factors that we identified in Section 5.3 as the most economically 
important such as size, profitability, tangibility, tax-related factors, and inflation.  
The few small differences relate to the remaining less economically important factors. For 
instance, while firm growth is positively associated with long-term leverage for manufacturing 
firms (consistent with the pecking order theory), it is negatively correlated with short-term 
leverage for non-manufacturing firms (consistent with the static trade-off theory). Also, 
comparison of the magnitudes of coefficients suggests that the debt ratios of manufacturing firms 
respond more to changes in size and profitability than non-manufacturing firms. The most 
striking difference relates to the impact of capital flows, however. In particular, the coefficient on 
capital flows is both much more significant and considerably larger in the non-manufacturing 
equations. This finding might suggest that international capital has tended to flow remarkably 
more to the sectors outside manufacturing, thereby influencing the financing patterns of the firms 
in such sectors to a greater extent during our sample period. In light of our findings in Section 
5.4, this seems to be particularly true after the early 2000s, a period during which capital inflows 
soared. Our findings, therefore, might be interpreted as evidence that risks created by capital 
flows has tended to accumulate more in the sectors outside the manufacturing sector, especially 
after the 2000s. There is reason to believe that this is a general phenomenon among emerging 
market economies as UNCTAD (2004) and Doytch and Uctum (2011) show that there has been a 
large increase in the amount of foreign investment in services relative to that of manufacturing 
from the 1990s to the 2000s.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 6.2 Large firms versus small firms 
Previous research (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999) provides evidence that 
differences in access to financial markets and institutions might lead to differences in financing 
patterns of firms of different sizes. To see if this is the case, we plot in Figure 2 the ratios of 
short-term, long-term, and total indebtedness by firm size averaged over the whole sample period. 
We divide the firms into quartiles by value of total assets and report the average debt ratios of the 
smallest 25%, the largest 25%, and those in between the smallest and largest quartiles. The figure 
shows that larger firms have higher long-term leverage and lower short-term leverage than 
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smaller firms. By contrast, there do not appear to be differences in total debt ratios across firm-
size quartiles.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In order to investigate the capital structure choices of firms of various sizes, we rerun our 
regressions separately for the smallest and largest firms. Results displayed in Table 8 suggest that 
there are marked differences across firm sizes in how various factors are related with debt ratios. 
At the firm level, the most striking differences are in the effects of firm size and business risk 
factors. Specifically, for small firms, the association between leverage and size is relatively weak. 
In fact, firm size appears to become relevant for leverage decisions only when a firm is 
sufficiently large. This may be indicative of a “threshold effect” in size in the sense that marginal 
changes in the size of firms smaller than a certain threshold have little effect on such firms’ 
ability to raise external debt. The business risk factor, on the other hand, is highly significant in 
all leverage regressions for small firms but always insignificant for large firms. Thus, while small 
firms’ ability to raise debt seems very sensitive to their riskiness, large firms’ access to debt is not 
hindered by that at all. Finally, the debt ratios of large and small firms appear to be affected 
differently by firm growth rates. Specifically, while firm growth is not related with leverage for 
small firms, there is some evidence that short-term and total leverage go down with firm growth 
for large firms. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Our results in Table 8 also suggest that there are interesting differences between large and small 
firms in how various industry-related and macroeconomic factors are related with debt ratios. For 
example, the coefficient on industry median leverage is much more significant and remarkably 
larger for large firms, suggesting that target adjustment is a much more pertinent phenomenon 
among large firms. One explanation of this finding could be that there are fundamental 
technological differences between small and large firms and hence naturally follow different 
financial policies a la Maksimovic and Zechner (1991). Or, as documented in World Bank Group 
(2010)  and hinted by our findings on the relationships between leverage and size and business 
risk and between leverage and capital flows (see below), it could reflect differences between 
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small and large firms in access to external finance, which prevent small firms from following an 
optimal financial policy.  
With respect to macro-level factors, the most striking difference between large and small firm 
capital structures is in inflation. Specifically, while inflation does not seem to be related with the 
leverage decisions of small firms, large firms’ leverage increases with inflation. This might 
suggest that, once the direct leverage impact of taxes is taken into account, inflation does not 
induce a further tax benefit for debt financing for small firms. Capital flows also appear to 
influence large and small firms differently, with capital flows having a remarkably greater 
importance for the leverage decisions of large firms. This might be explained by the fact that 
large firms are more diverse and informationally more transparent than small firms, which 
increases their ability to secure funds from domestic sources as well as directly from foreign 
sources. Our findings in Section 5.4 suggest that this difference has been considerably starker 
after the early 2000s. Finally, the association of leverage and GDP growth seems to be 
significantly stronger in the case of large firms, likely reflecting the fact that large firms are better 
equipped to capture the benefits of economic growth.  
Overall, our findings on the relationships between leverage and various leverage factors appear to 
be more in line with the predictions of static trade-off theory than with the pecking order theory, 
particularly in the case of large firms.  
6.3 Mature firms versus young firms 
Mature firms have been around longer and possibly have built-up reputations for meeting their 
financial obligations, which may ease their access to capital markets. From a static trade-off 
perspective, this would imply a positive relation between maturity of a firm and leverage, 
whereas a negative relation would be expected from a pecking order perspective. Furthermore, 
mature firms are also typically larger, which may further improve their ability to raise external 
funds. Thus, it might be interesting to see if in fact such firms are different from young firms in 
terms of their capital structure choices. 
We define young firms as firms that are at most seven years old and mature firms as firms that are 
at least twenty years old, which roughly corresponds to the first and fourth quartiles of the age 
distribution of firms, respectively. Since our dataset provides information on firms’ dates of 
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incorporation, we are able to determine the exact age of each firm in our sample in any given 
year. Figure 3 plots the ratios of short-term, long-term, and total indebtedness by firm age 
averaged over the whole sample period. The figure shows that the more mature the firm the 
smaller the leverage, but the pattern is clearer for short-term leverage. These results cannot be 
explained by the fact that mature firms tend to be large, since we know from Section 6.2 that 
larger firms have higher leverage, not lower.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
In order to further investigate the capital structure differences between young and mature firms, 
we rerun our regressions separately for young and mature firms. Results presented in Table 9 
suggest that there are as many differences as there are similarities. While there is no material 
difference between young and mature firms in the association of leverage with profitability, 
tangibility, tax-related factors, industry-related factors, or inflation, this is not so for the 
remaining leverage factors. In particular, the correlation between leverage and size is quite weak 
for young firms, except for long-term leverage. Therefore, an increase in size appears to benefit a 
mature firm more than it benefits a young firm, again except in terms of long-term leverage. Also, 
while the coefficient of firm growth is not significant in any of the leverage equations for young 
firms, it is significant at 5 percent in the short-term leverage equation for mature firms. More 
interestingly, the coefficient of business risk is significant only in the leverage equations for 
mature firms, suggesting that leverage decisions of young firms are not affected by variations in 
business risk. One explanation of this finding could be that young firms tend to rely on internal 
funds, the availability of which, unlike external funds (equity or debt), is not as sensitive to 
variations in business risk in the first place.13  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
There are also interesting differences between young and mature firms in how debt ratios are 
related with GDP growth and capital flows. In particular, the coefficient of GDP growth is never 
significant in leverage equations for young firms, which is in stark contrast with the case for 
mature firms. From the perspectives of both the trade-off theory and pecking order hypothesis, 
this result suggests availability of growth opportunities for mature firms and the lack thereof for 
                                                          
13
 Another explanation could be that our definition of business risk, the standard deviation of operating income over 
total assets over the past three years (including the current year), is not a good proxy of business risk for young firms.  
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young firms during our sample period. Capital flows, on the other hand, while unrelated with the 
leverage decisions of young firms, appear to have a significant and positive association with 
leverage decisions of mature firms, and more so after the early 2000s (see Section 5.4). In 
addition, combined with our results from Section 6.2, we can infer that international capital has 
tended to flow more to large and mature firms during our sample period. This result is in line with 
the findings of Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) who find that international 
investors invest more in large and mature firms. This can be attributed to asymmetric information 
problems, which tend to be greater in smaller and younger firms (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001 
and Forbes, 2007). 
Overall, our findings on the relationships between leverage and various leverage factors appear to 
be more in line with the predictions of static trade-off theory than with the pecking order theory, 
particularly in the case of mature firms. 
7. Pecking order or static trade-off? 
Which of the two major theories, pecking order and static trade-off, is a better description of our 
findings? Current research on the Turkish economy generally views the pecking order theory as a 
better framework than the static trade-off theory for understanding the capital structure of Turkish 
firms (see, for example, Acaravcı and Doğukanlı, 2004; Korkmaz et al., 2007; and Yıldız et al., 
2009). The formation of this view can be traced to the finding of a negative sign on the 
coefficient of profitability and the sometimes mixed results obtained for the factors that are more 
closely associated with the static trade-off theory such as corporate debt tax shields and non-debt 
tax shields. We confirm the negative and highly significant correlation of profitability with 
leverage in our data sample as well. However, our findings suggest that, on the whole, the static 
trade-off theory provides a better account of the capital structure decisions of Turkish firms than 
the pecking order theory. Table 10 presents the predictions of the two theories alongside with our 
empirical findings. The table includes only those factors for which at least one of the two theories 
has a prediction. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
A simple comparison of the signs reveals that the static trade-off theory has more correct 
predictions than the pecking order theory. The main advantage of pecking order theory over the 
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static trade-off theory is that it predicts the sign of profitability correctly. This is important 
because profitability is probably the only leverage factor that has a robust (negative) association 
with leverage in the data in all countries. Note, however, that a negative sign can also be 
rationalized in dynamic versions of the trade-off theory such as Fischer et al. (1989) and 
Hennessy and Whited (2005). On the other hand, the pecking order theory has difficulty 
accounting for the positive signs on size and tangibility as well as explaining the negative 
association between leverage and GDP growth. Perhaps as importantly, the theory does not 
generate predictions about some very key leverage factors such as corporate debt tax shields, non-
debt tax shields, and inflation for which the static trade-off theory correctly predicts the nature of 
the association with leverage. 
Myers (2003) argued that different factors might affect different types of firms in fundamentally 
different ways. Moreover, the capital structure choice of a given firm is, at least to some extent, 
also dependent on the types of other firms operating in the same economy. If this is true, then 
expecting a single capital structure model to account for the behavior of firms in different 
situations may not be reasonable. This is in fact what we have found: Neither the pecking order 
theory nor the static trade-off theory can simultaneously account for all of the empirical 
observations.   
8. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we examine the determinants of capital structure for non-financial firms in Turkey. 
The novelty of our paper comes from the fact that we use a new dataset that is substantially larger 
and more comprehensive in terms of both time and variable coverage than those used in previous 
studies on individual emerging and developing economies. Our dataset includes manufacturing, 
non-manufacturing, small, large, listed and unlisted firms, which enables us to take a more 
accurate picture of the capital structure choices of the average non-financial firm. 
Several results emerge from our analysis. First, we find that regardless of their size, age, and 
industrial membership, firms’ short-term leverage is generally substantially larger than their long-
term leverage, indicating that short-term finance was and still is the norm for Turkish non-
financial firms, particularly for young and small manufacturing firms. In addition, we provide 
evidence that, from a capital structure perspective, the most distinguishing characteristic of a firm 
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is its size rather than its age or industrial membership. Second, we find that each of the firm- and 
industry-specific, tax-related, and macroeconomic leverage factor types does indeed play a role in 
shaping the capital structure decisions of Turkish non-financial firms during the past fifteen 
years. Third, unlike most of the previous studies on the Turkish economy, we consider a wide 
range of leverage factors and provide evidence that these factors have the signs that would be 
expected in light of previous theoretical results and empirical findings obtained for developed and 
developing countries. Fourth, the economic importance of a given factor can be different for 
different leverage definitions. In particular, while potential debt tax shields are the most important 
factor for short-term debt ratios, tangibility is the most important factor for long-term debt ratios. 
Fourth, firms match the maturity of their assets and liabilities. Fifth, firms adjust their leverage 
(particularly short-term) towards the industry median. Sixth, inflation is among the economically 
significant leverage factors and is by far the most important macroeconomic leverage factor. This 
seems to be especially true for large firms after the early 2000s. Finally, capital flows have a 
marked influence on firms’ capital structures, particularly for non-manufacturing firms that are 
large and mature. Overall, our empirical findings suggest that the trade-off theory may be a better 
description of the capital structures of Turkish non-financial firms than the pecking-order theory, 
particularly after the early 2000s.  
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Table 1  
Definitions and Hypotheses 
This table describes the dependent and independent variables and the theoretical predictions 
for the relations between the dependent and independent variables.   
     
 Definition Pecking Order  Trade-Off 
Debt Ratios    
    
Short-term leverage  Short-term debt / Total assets N/A             N/A  
Long-term leverage Long-term debt / Total assets N/A N/A 
Total leverage Total debt / Total assets N/A N/A 
Firm-specific factors    
        
Size Natural logarithm of total net sales +/- + 
 
Profitability  
 
Operating income / Total assets 
 
- 
 
+/- 
 
Tangibility 
 
Net fixed assets / Total assets 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Growth 
 
Percent change in net sales 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
Business risk 
 
 
Std. dev. of operating income / Total assets  
 
- 
 
- 
Tax-related factors    
 
Potential debt tax shields 
 
Interest payments + 
Tax payments / Corporate tax rate 
? + 
 
Tax exhaust  Dummy equal to 1 if firm pays no tax ? + 
    
Industry-specific factors    
 
Industry median leverage 
 
Industry median of (short, long, or total) 
debt to total assets 
? + 
Macroeconomic factors  
    
Inflation Percent change in CPI ? + 
 
GDP growth 
 
Percent change in real GDP 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
Capital flows 
 
Net capital flows / GDP 
 
? 
 
? 
33 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
described in Table 1. All variables (other than industry-specific and macroeconomic variables) 
are winsorized at 0.50% level in both tails of the distribution. The sample period is 1996-2009. 
All numbers are reported in two decimal places. Agricultural firms, financial firms and firms that 
operate in regulated industries are excluded.  
 Observations First 
Quartile 
Mean Median Third 
Quartile 
Coefficient  
of Variation 
Debt ratios      
Short-term leverage 74155 3.48 20.37 15.08 31.57 97.12 
Long-term leverage 74155 0.00 6.81 0.00 7.73 195.37 
Total leverage 74155 7.73 27.20 23.87 42.17 81.18 
Firm-specific factors       
        
Size 74155 12.93 14.01 14.04 15.15 12.72 
Profitability 74155 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.15 156.83 
Tangibility 74155 10.82 31.36 25.87 46.78 78.39 
Growth 74155 -18.94 44.35 1.57 24.07 1005.70 
Business risk 74155 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.10 100.96 
Tax-related factors       
Potential debt tax shields 74155 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 188.91 
Tax exhaust 74155 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 130.65 
Industry-specific  factors       
Short-term industry 
median leverage 
28 10.68 13.64 12.69 17.28 30.34 
Long-term industry 
median leverage 
28 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.04 217.86 
Total industry median 
leverage 
28 
 
17.05 22.04 22.78 26.87 28.32 
 
Macroeconomic factors      
       
Inflation    14 10.51 50.61 54.40 84.64 70.14 
GDP growth    14 0.66 3.56 6.16 7.58 143.92 
Capital flows    14 2.14 2.91 3.02 4.85 104.37 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Leverage: Full Sample Results 
This table presents the results from the estimation of our fixed effects panel regression 
equation (1): itik itkkit FL εµββ +++= ∑ ,0 , where  is one of the three measures of leverage 
(short, long, or total leverage) of firm i  in year t ;  is the vector of the four types of leverage 
factors (firm-specific, tax-related, industry-specific, and macroeconomic factors);  are the 
time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects; and 		 is the error term. The variables are 
the same as those defined in Table 1 and all (except growth) are reported in three decimal 
places. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
Firm-specific factors Short-term  Long-term  Total  
 Leverage leverage leverage 
Size 1.079*** 0.843*** 1.918*** 
 
(0.100) (0.0734) (0.114) 
Profitability -15.260*** -5. 358*** -20.690*** 
  (0.677) (0.454) (0.755) 
Tangibility -0.072*** 0.097*** 0.025*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Growth -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Business risk -1.527 -4.245*** -5.692*** 
 (1.189) (0.751) (1.306) 
Tax-related factors    
Potential debt tax shields  40.080*** 10.350*** 50.280*** 
  (1.461) (0.938) (1.566) 
Tax exhaust  4.221*** 2.261*** 6.500*** 
  (0.170) (0.122) (0.189) 
Industry-specific  factors  
Industry median leverage 0.329*** 0.423*** 0.234*** 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.021) 
Macroeconomic factors  
Inflation 0.037*** 0.015*** 0.057*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
GDP growth -0.000 -0.105*** -0.071 
  (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) 
Capital flows 0.106*** 0.119*** 0.188*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0226) (0.0361) 
Number of observations 74155 74155 74155 
Number of firms 11726 11726 11726 
Adjusted R-squared 0.650 0.612 0.673 
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Table 4 
Economic Significance of Leverage Factors 
This table presents the findings on the relative economic significance of various leverage factors. 
The estimated standardized coefficients show the impact of a one standard deviation change in 
an independent variable on the dependent variable. The magnitudes of the standardized 
coefficients are comparable across different leverage factors. The left panel shows these results. 
The right panel sorts the leverage factors according to their economic significance, where the 
ordering is based on the absolute value of the standardized coefficients. When a variable has a 
statistically insignificant coefficient it is denoted by “_” and left out of the economic significance 
rankings. The variables are the same as those defined in Table 1 and all are reported in three 
decimal places. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Standardized Coefficients Rankings 
 Short-term  Long-term  Total  Short-term  Long-term  Total  
Firm-specific factors Leverage leverage leverage Leverage leverage leverage 
  
         
Size 0.097 0.113 0.155 4 2 2 
 
      
Profitability -0.106 -0.055 -0.129 2 4 4 
        
Tangibility -0.089 0.179 0.028 5 1 7 
        
Growth -0.005 0.001 -0.004 _ _ _ 
        
Business risk -0.006 -0.024 -0.019 _ 9 9 
Tax-related factors       
 
Potential debt tax shields  0.142 0.054 0.160 1 5 1 
        
Tax exhaust 0.103 0.082 0.142 3 3 3 
Industry-specific  factors       
Industry median leverage 0.063 0.037 0.059 6 7 6 
Macroeconomic factors     
       
Inflation 0.056 0.033 0.077 7 8 5 
        
GDP growth 0.000 -0.038 -0.016 _ 6 10 
        
Capital flows 0.014 0.024 0.023 8 10 8 
       
Number of observations 74155 74155 74155    
Number of firms 11726 11726 11726    
Adjusted R-squared 0.650 0.612 0.673    
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Table 5 
Robustness of Full Sample Results to Attrition Bias 
This table presents a summary of robustness tests on the attrition bias due to entry or exit of 
some firms to or from the dataset. The estimates are obtained only for those firms that have 
data for T years or more, where T = 2, 3, ..,14 (T = 1 corresponds to the full sample results in 
Table 3). The table displays, for each leverage factor and for each of the short-term, long-term, 
and total regression equation specifications, the total number of positive and negative signs in 
the thirteen regressions we run. The variables are the same as those defined in Table 1.  
 
  
 Short-term  Short-term  Long-term  Long-term  Total  Total  
Firm-specific factors Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive 
  
         
Size 0 13 0 13 0 13 
 
      
Profitability 13 0 13 0 13 0 
        
Tangibility 13 0 0 13 0 7 
        
Growth 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Business risk 0 0 13 0 11 0 
       
Tax-related factors       
 
Potential debt tax shields  0 13 0 13 0 13 
        
Tax exhaust 
0 13 0 13 0 13 
Industry-specific  factors       
Industry median leverage 0 13 0 13 0 13 
Macroeconomic factors     
       
Inflation 0 13 0 13 0 13 
        
GDP growth 6 0 13 0 13 0 
        
Capital flows 0 13 0 11 0 13 
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Table 6 
Robustness of Full Sample Results to Alternative Time Periods 
This table presents the findings on the robustness of full sample results considering separately the period before 2002 and the period 
after 2002. The variables are the same as those defined in Table 1 and all (except growth) are reported in three decimal places. 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance levels 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                             1996 – 2002 2003 - 2009 
  
      
 Short-term  Long-term  Total  Short-term  Long-term  Total  
Firm-specific factors leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage 
  
            
Size 0.074  0.442*** 0.519** 1.185*** 0.721*** 1.890*** 
 (0.212) (0.121) (0.222) (0.121) (0.095) (0.141) 
 
Profitability -14.100*** -3.970*** -18.010*** -16.570*** -6.660*** -23.320*** 
  (0.986) (0.583) (1.044) (1.001) (0.740) (1.141) 
 
Tangibility -0.036*** 0.070*** 0.035*** -0.060*** 0.124*** 0.064*** 
  (0.0106) (0.00748) (0.0113) (0.00825) (0.00663) (0.00918) 
 
Growth 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003** 0.0001 -0.0003 
  (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
       
Business risk -3.927** -2.838*** -6.578*** -2.674 -3.433*** -6.165*** 
 (1.778) (0.965) (1.864) (1.733) (1.200) (1.931) 
Tax-related factors       
 
Potential debt tax shields  31.890*** 4.263*** 35.970*** 54.620*** 16.120*** 70.820*** 
  (1.756) (1.039) (1.807) (3.516) (2.481) (3.701) 
 
Tax exhaust 6.188*** 2.205*** 8.390*** 2.968*** 1.837*** 4.828*** 
  (0.331) (0.218) (0.349) (0.208) (0.159) (0.230) 
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Industry-specific  factors     
       
Industry median leverage 0.453*** _
a 
0.443*** 0.412*** 0.135 0.206*** 
  (0.127)  (0.090) (0.099) (0.101) (0.041) 
       
Macroeconomic factors     
       
Inflation 0.027* 0.007 0.030** 0.060*** 0.038*** 0.132*** 
  (0.015) (0.005) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) 
 
GDP growth 0.033 -0.033* 0.022 -0.011 -0.231*** -0.166*** 
  (0.028) (0.018) (0.028) (0.024) (0.030) (0.039) 
 
Capital flows 0.039 -0.018 -0.042 0.101** 0.224*** 0.311*** 
  (0.074) (0.038) (0.076) (0.045) (0.027) (0.046) 
 
      
Number of observations 
 
31732 31732 31732 40717 40717 40717 
Number of firms 
 
7311 7311 7311 8447 8447 8447 
Adjusted R-squared 0.738 0.701 0.758 0.726 0.711 0.763 
a Since most of the firms did not have long-term debt before 2002, the median debt for manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries were 
zero. Thus, there is no variation in industry median leverage variable in the 1996-2002 period and its coefficient cannot be estimated. 
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Table 7 
Sample Split between Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing Firms 
This table presents the findings considering separately manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The variables are the same as 
those defined in Table 1 and all (except growth) are reported in three decimal places. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                            Manufacturing  Firms Non-Manufacturing Firms 
        
 Short-term  Long-term  Total  Short-term  Long-term  Total  
Firm-specific factors leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage 
              
Size 1.432*** 1.207*** 2.615*** 0.787*** 0.632*** 1. 395*** 
 (0.176) (0.134) (0.202) (0.123) (0.086) (0.138) 
 
Profitability -20.000*** -6.553*** -26.510*** -10.420*** -4.267*** -14.770*** 
  (0.900) (0.604) (0.995) (1.024) (0.698) (1.153) 
 
Tangibility -0.120*** 0.104*** -0.017** -0.010 0.090*** 0.080*** 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.00709) (0.0104) 
 
Growth 0.0001 0.0008* 0.0010 -0.0002* -0.0000 -0.0002 
  (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
 
Business risk -2.646 -2.883*** -5.317*** -1. 340 -5.406*** -6.559*** 
 (1.664) (1.005) (1.785) (1.702) (1.121) (1.911) 
 
Tax-related factors       
 
Potential debt tax shields 
 
43.550*** 
 
10.730*** 
 
54.160*** 
 
34.560*** 
 
10.170*** 44.640*** 
  (1.772) (1.143) (1.910) (2.486) (1.614) (2.636) 
 
Tax exhaust 4.733*** 2.366*** 7.107*** 3.405*** 2.153*** 5.583*** 
  (0.211) (0.151) (0.234) (0.285) (0.206) (0.314) 
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Industry-specific  factors     
       
Industry median leverage 0.421*** 0.489*** 0. 334*** 0.264*** 0.426*** 0.204*** 
  (0.060) (0.077) (0.038) (0.070) (0.092) (0.029) 
       
Macroeconomic factors     
       
Inflation 0.036*** 0.019*** 0.057*** 0.037*** 0.010** 0.056*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
 
GDP growth -0.005 -0.098*** -0.081*** 0.013 -0.109*** -0.035 
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.021) (0.032) 
 
Capital flows 0.046 0.075** 0.115** 0.151*** 0.169*** 0.210*** 
  (0.041) (0.030) (0.046) (0.054) (0.036) (0.060) 
       
Number of observations 
 
42998 42998 42998 31134 31134 31134 
Number of firms 
 
6262 6262 6262 5566 5566 5566 
Adjusted R-squared 0.646 0.577 0.658 0.657 0.654 0.692 
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Table 8 
Sample Split between Small and Large Firms 
This table presents the findings considering separately small and large firms. Firms are divided into quartiles by value of total assets. 
A firm is classified as “small” if it is below the first quartile and “large” if it is above the third quartile. The variables are the same as 
those defined in Table 1 and all (except growth) are reported in three decimal places. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                             Small Firms Large Firms 
        
 Short-term  Long-term  Total  Short-term  Long-term  Total  
Firm-specific factors leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage 
              
Size 0.191 0.357** 0.524* 0.774*** 0.979*** 1.757*** 
 (0.264) (0.146) (0.281) (0.173) (0.144) (0.205) 
 
Profitability -12.980*** -3.992*** -17.060*** -20.560*** -8.258*** -28.850*** 
  (1.476) (0.869) (1.599) (1.327) (1.103) (1.585) 
 
Tangibility -0.010 0.044*** 0.033** -0.118*** 0.131*** 0.0127 
  (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.0104) (0.00983) (0.0127) 
 
Growth 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0004* -0.0000 -0.0004** 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
Business risk -9.677*** -4.847*** -14.580*** 0.379 -1.431 -1.033 
 (2.573) (1.400) (2.781) (2. 384) (1.927) (2.773) 
Tax-related factors       
 
Potential debt tax shields 
 
40.170*** 
 
1.427 
 
41.760*** 
 
33.850*** 
 
14.800*** 48.160*** 
  (4.289) (2.204) (4.617) (2. 395) (1.802) (2.652) 
 
Tax exhaust 
 
3.486*** 
 
0.677** 
 
4.216*** 
 
4.447*** 
 
3.102*** 
 
7.521*** 
  (0.479) (0.295) (0.503) (0.282) (0.234) (0.330) 
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Industry-specific  factors     
       
Industry median leverage 0.117 0.105 0.111** 0.233*** 0.574*** 0.189*** 
  (0.122) (0.120) (0.053) (0.0674) (0.117) (0.0375) 
       
Macroeconomic factors 
 
    
       
Inflation 0.007 -0.004 0.007 0.067*** 0.028*** 0.094*** 
  (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
GDP growth 0.088** -0.063** 0.062 -0.154*** -0.118*** -0.279*** 
  (0.044) (0.031) (0.051) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) 
 
Capital flows 0.0795 0.118** 0.151 0.131** 0.138*** 0.263*** 
  (0.091) (0.053) (0.094) (0.055) (0.046) (0.063) 
       
Number of observations 
 
14843 14843 14843 20883 20883 20883 
Number of firms 
 
3456 3456 3456 3245 3245 3245 
Adjusted R-squared 0.686 0.679 0.719 0.703 0.639 0.725 
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Table 9 
Sample Split between Young and Mature Firms 
This table presents the findings considering separately young and mature firms. A firm is classified as “young” if it is at most seven 
years old and “mature” if it is at least twenty years old. The variables are the same as those defined in Table 1 and all (except growth) 
are reported in three decimal places. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                             Young Firms Mature Firms 
  
      
 Short-term  Long-term  Total  Short-term  Long-term  Total  
Firm-specific factors leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage 
  
            
Size -0.076 0.941*** 0.795* 1.823*** 0.789*** 2.616*** 
 (0.389) (0.254) (0.435) (0.165) (0.138) (0.199) 
 
Profitability -14.53*** -2.571* -17.17*** -16.360*** -6.961*** -23.340*** 
  (2.078) (1.404) (2.244) (1.066) (0.819) (1.242) 
 
Tangibility -0.001 0.097*** 0.0863*** -0.089*** 0.090*** 0.002 
  (0.022) (0.016) (0.025) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) 
 
Growth 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0003** 0.0001 -0.0002 
  (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
Business risk -0.593 -3.246 -3.784 -3.951** -4.697*** -8.697*** 
 (4.008) (2.379) (4.490) (1.980) (1.341) (2.228) 
Tax-related factors       
 
Potential debt tax shields  
 
35.080*** 
 
1.094 
 
36.030*** 
 
41.240*** 
 
11.100*** 52.270*** 
  (4.758) (2.460) (4.705) (2.503) (1.707) (2.649) 
 
Tax exhaust 
 
3.415*** 
 
1.260*** 
 
4.706*** 
 
4.927*** 
 
2.539*** 
 
7.476*** 
  (0.613) (0.397) (0.639) (0.271) (0.199) (0.304) 
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Industry-specific  factors     
       
Industry median leverage 0.328** 0.189 0.255*** 0.225*** 0.266*** 0.123*** 
  (0.158) (0.296) (0.091) (0.068) (0.090) (0.035) 
       
Macroeconomic factors     
       
Inflation 0.050*** 0.002 0.056*** 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.053*** 
  (0.015) (0.009) (0.016) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
GDP growth 0.034 -0.043 0.041 -0.089** -0.106*** -0.189*** 
  (0.058) (0.039) (0.060) (0.025) (0.023) (0.031) 
 
Capital flows 0.135 0.018 0.092 0.148*** 0.071** 0.225*** 
  (0.111) (0.075) (0.118) (0.052) (0.036) (0.057) 
 
      
Number of observations 
 
9539 9539 9539 25507 25507 25507 
Number of firms 
 
2786 2786 2786 4111 4111 4111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.774 0.794 0.794 0.663 0.603 0.698 
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Table 10  
Comparison of Theoretical Predictions with Data Facts 
This table presents the predictions of the pecking order and static trade-off theories alongside 
with our empirical findings for the relations between the dependent and independent variables. 
    
 Pecking Order Static Trade-off  Data 
 Theory Theory  
Firm-specific factors    
        
Size +/- + + 
 
Profitability 
 
- 
 
+/- 
 
- 
 
Tangibility  - + 
 
+ 
 
Growth 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
? 
 
Business risk 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Tax-related factors    
 
Potential debt tax shields ? + + 
 
Tax exhaust ? + + 
    
Industry-specific  factors    
Industry median leverage ? + + 
Macroeconomic factors  
    
Inflation ? + + 
 
GDP growth 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
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Figure 1  
Debt Ratios: Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Firms 
This figure displays the ratios of short-term, long-term, and total debt to total assets for 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms averaged over the entire sample period. 
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Figure 2  
Debt Ratios: Small, Medium, and Large Firms 
This figure displays the ratios of short-term, long-term, and total debt to total assets by firm size 
averaged over the entire sample period. Firms are divided into quartiles by value of total assets. 
A firm is classified as “small” if it is below the first quartile, “medium” if it is between the first 
and third quartiles, and “large” if it is above the third quartile.  
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Figure 3 
Debt Ratios: Young, Middle-aged, and Mature Firms 
This figure displays the ratios of short-term, long-term, and total debt to total assets by firm age 
averaged over the entire sample period. A firm is classified as “young” if it is at most seven years 
old, “middle-aged” if it is at least seven years old and at most twenty years old, and “mature” if 
it is at least twenty years old.  
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